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The   cultural   grammar   of governance:    
The   UK   Code of   Corporate   Governance, reflexivity,   and   the   limits 
of   ‘soft’   regulation 
Abstract 
We		identify		limits		of		‘reflexive		governance’		by		examining		the		UK		Code		of		Corporate 
Governance		that		is		celebrated		for		its		‘reflexivity’.		By		placing		the		historical		genesis		of		the 
Code		within		its		politico-economic		context,		it		is		shown		how		its		scope		and		penetration		is 
impeded		by		a		shallow,		‘single		loop’		of		reflexivity.		Legitimized		by		agency		theory,		the		Code 
is		infused		by		a		‘cultural		grammar’		that		perpetuates		relations		of		shareholder		primacy		as		it 
restricts		accountability		to		narrow		forms		of		information		disclosure		directed		exclusively 
at		shareholders.		Engagement		of		a		deeper,		‘double		loop’		reflexivity		allows		account		to		be 
taken		of		the		historical		conditions		and		theoretical		conceptions		that		shape		practices		and 
outcomes		of		corporate		governance.		Only		then		is		it		possible		to		disclose,		challenge		and 
reform		narrow		conceptions,		boundaries		and		workings		of		‘reflexive		governance’. 
Keywords 
corporate		governance,		industrial		relations,		management,		organizational		theory, 
participation		and		workplace		democracy,		reflexivity,		soft		law,		strategic		and		international 
management,		top		management,		trade		unions 
Introduction 
In		recent		years,		concerns		have		grown		about		the		vulnerability		of		public		and		private		insti- 
tutions		to		instability		and		crisis.		To		remedy		failures		attributed		to		inadequate		forms		of 
governance,		comparatively		‘hard’		measures		based		upon		statutory		regulation		have		been 
complemented,		and		sometimes		displaced,		by		forms		of		‘soft’		governance		that		rely		upon 
private		initiatives		and		mechanisms		of		control		(Abbott		and		Snidal,		2000).		The		advocacy 
and		justification		of		‘soft’		forms		of		governance		rests,		in		substantial		part,		on		the		efficacy 
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ascribed		to		reflexivity		as		a		means		of		continuous,		self-organizing		improvement		of		regula- 
tory		practice.		In		this		article,		we		focus		on		the		commendation		and		incorporation		of		reflex- 
ivity		in		the		field		of		corporate		governance. 
The		governance		of		corporations		merits		close		scrutiny		and		debate		as		it		frames		‘a		wide 
range		of		relations		and		institutional		arrangements		that		shape		who		controls		corporations, 
what		interests		corporations		serve,		and		how		risks		and		rewards		are		allocated		among		stake- 
holders’		(Jackson,		2000:		267).		Corporate		governance		contributes		to		forming,		shaping 
and		guiding		relations		between		internal		constituencies		(e.g.		employees);		it		conditions		how 
corporations		relate		to		wider,		external		constituencies		(e.g.		shareholders);		and		it		serves		to 
hold		organizational		members,		notably		executives,		responsible		and		accountable		to		such 
constituencies.		With		a		few		exceptions		(e.g.		Crouch,		2011;		Davis,		2009;		Deetz,		1992; 
Ezzamel		and		Reed,		2008;		Khurana,		2007;		Lounsbury		and		Hirsch,		2010;		Perrow,		2002; 
Pye,		2002),		corporate		governance		has,		however,		been		neglected		or		marginalized		within 
the		field		of		organization		studies		and		associated		streams		of		research		on		corporate		behav- 
iour.		This		is		lamentable		not		least		because		the		UK’s		Code		of		Corporate		Governance		has 
supported		an		increasingly		financialized		economy		that		endorses		the		capture		of		rents		by		a 
tiny		financial		elite		(Veldman		and	Willmott,		2013)		with		divisive		effects		on		the		global		divi- 
sion		of		wealth		(Ireland,		2005;		Piketty,		2014). 
In		the		UK,		a		key		moment		in		the		recent		history		of		corporate		governance		was		the		pub- 
lication,		in		1992,		of		the		Report		of		the		Committee		on		the		Financial		Aspects		of		Corporate 
Governance.		Widely		known		as		the		Cadbury		Committee		and		the		Cadbury		Report,		after 
the		name		of		its		Chairman,1		its		work		provided		the		basic		framework		for		what		became		the 
UK		Combined		Code		of		Corporate		Governance.2		The		Code		has		been		adopted		as		a		blue- 
print		of		‘best		practice’		in		the		EU		(Keay,		2014:		282)		and		worldwide		(Henry,		2008:		400; 
Jordan,		2013:		9,		26),		even		when		national		regulators		are		sceptical		about		the		appropriate- 
ness		of		the		Code’s		model.3		The		impact		of		the		Cadbury		Committee’s		deliberations,		it		has 
been		suggested,		‘cannot		be		overstated’	as		‘[n]early		every		corporate		governance		develop- 
ment		in		the		UK		and		throughout		the		world		in		the		past		two		decades		has		derived		much		of		its 
content		and		inspiration		from		the		Cadbury		Report’	(Jones		and		Pierce,		2013:		31). 
Of		greatest		relevance		to		our		analysis		of		‘soft’	forms		of		governance		in		which		reflexiv- 
ity		is		prized,		the		Code		is		widely		celebrated		as		a		prime		example		of		‘regulatory		instruments 
which		are		explicitly		designed		to		be		“reflexive”’		(Cankar		et		al.,		2010:		510).		The		Code’s 
design		explicitly		institutionalizes		a		continuous		and		ongoing		process		of		learning		and 
reflection		through		regular		reviews		and		updating.		As		Spira		and		Slinn		(2013:		222)		note, 
‘The		Code		is		regularly		reviewed,		in		recognition		of		the		need		to		adapt		its		requirements		to 
the		changing		corporate		landscape’.		The		incorporation		of		reflexivity		into		the		Code		con- 
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veys		the		strong		suggestion		that		it		institutionalizes		a		permanent		process		of		thoughtful 
application		and		review		based		on		‘best		practice(s)’.		Such		reflexive		governance		promises 
to		forestall		potential		pathologies		and		crises		that		threaten		confidence		in		corporate		govern- 
ance,		and		so		bestows		upon		the		Code		a		degree		of		credibility		and		legitimacy		that		has 
inspired		and		supported		its		worldwide		adoption. 
Given		the		importance		of		the		UK		Code		in		framing		international		corporate		governance 
prescriptions;		considering		that		it		is		hailed		as		a		prominent		and		widely		commended		exam- 
ple		of		‘soft’	regulation;		and,		recognizing,		moreover,		how		the		legitimacy		of		the		UK		Code 
trades		upon		its		‘reflexive’		approach,		the		question		addressed		in		this		article		concerns		the 
nature		and		role		of		the		‘reflexivity’		in		the		Code’s		design		and		operation.		We		begin		by 
addressing		the		reflexive		turn		in		governance		where		forms		of		‘soft		law’		have		been		com- 
mended		and		introduced		to		facilitate		processes		of	‘collective		learning’		and		continuous 
improvement		through		private,		voluntary		agreements.		We		then		consider		the		Code		as		an 
example		of		‘reflexivity		in		practice’.		We		note		how,		despite		the		celebration		of		reflexivity, 
and		despite		the		seriousness		of		a		series		of		spectacular		failures,		the		preparers		and		overseers 
of		successive		incarnations		of		the		Code		have		paid		scant		attention		to		the		broader		historical 
framing		of		corporate		governance.		It		is		an		oversight		that,		we		argue,		naturalizes		and		pre- 
serves		a		particular		agency-theoretic		conception		of		governance.		In		a		discussion		section, 
we		show		how		the		claims		of		wider		constituencies		in		relation		to		accountability,		regulation 
and		control		were,		and		remain,		present		in		broader		conceptions		of		corporate		governance,4 
yet		these		considerations		are		largely		absent		from		the		institutionalization		and		operation		of 
the		Code.		This		leads		us		to		argue		that		limiting		reflexivity		to		a		‘single		loop’		in		the		design 
and		operation		of		the		Code		acts		to		affirm		and		protect		a		notion		of		corporate		governance		that 
supports		a		particular,		financialized		political		economy		where		the		claims		of		wider		constitu- 
encies		are		marginalized		or		even		excluded.		We		conclude		our		analysis		by		providing		point- 
ers		for		rethinking		reflexive		governance,		the		Code		and		corporate		governance		theory. 
Reflexivity		and		governance 
In		this		section,		we		consider		how		‘reflexivity’	is		articulated		in		the		institutionalization		of		the 
Code;	in	the	operation	of	the	Code;	and	in	processes	of	organizational	learning	and	change. 
The		reflexive		turn		in		governance 
The		incorporation		of		reflexivity		into		governance		has		informed		and		legitimized		policy 
and		analysis		in		diverse		fields		that		include		‘employment		policy,		social		inclusion,		enter- 
prise		promotion,		environmental		protection,		energy		policy		and		fundamental		human		rights’ 
(Deakin,		2009:		225)		as		well		as		politics,		education,		coastal		adaptation,		nanotechnology, 
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utility	systems,	culture,	risk,	sustainable	development	and	societal	development	(Goergen 
et		al.,		2010;		Scott,		2008;		Voss		and		Borneman,		2011;		Voss		and		Kemp,		2006).		Advocates 
of		‘reflexive		governance’	commend		it		for		attending		to,		and		advancing,		processes		of	‘col- 
lective		learning’,		intraorganizationally		and		interorganizationally		(see		Scott,		2008:		174), 
and		for		encouraging		‘multilevel		stakeholding’.		Central		to		the		philosophy		of		reflexive 
governance		are		processes		of		continuous		review		in		which		actors		are		conceived		to		revisit 
and		redefine		their		interests		and		actions		through		ongoing		deliberative		processes		where ‘no-
one		has		privileged		access		to		the		best		solution’	(De		Schutter		and		Deakin,		2003).In		principle,		the		incorporation		
of		reflexivity		into		governance		has		implications		for 
(re)interpreting		inter		alia		the		conditions		of		governance,		the		dynamics		of		its		practices		and 
its		(un)intended		consequences		(Voss		and		Bornemann,		2011).	A	strong		notion		of		reflexive 
governance		‘call(s)		into		question		the		foundations		of		governance		itself’	(Voss		and		Kemp, 
2006:		4)		as		it		invites		a		deconstruction		of		‘the		concepts,		practices		and		institutions		by 
which		societal		development		is		governed’	(Voss		and		Kemp,		2006:		4).		Within		this		framing 
of		reflexive		governance,		‘one		envisions		alternatives		and		reinvents		and		shapes		those		foun- 
dations’	(Voss		and		Kemp,		2006:		4).	We		characterize		this		strong		form		of		reflexive		govern- 
ance		as		‘double		loop’		a		notion		that		we		adapt		from		Argyris		and		Schön’s		(1978)		idea		of 
‘double		loop		learning’.		In		common		with		double		loop		learning,		it		encompasses		a		prepar- 
edness		to		facilitate,		and		not		just		to		contemplate,		change		in		the		multiple		arenas		of		govern- 
ance		formation		and		implementation.		Extending		beyond		a		‘single		loop’	of		learning		that		is 
restricted		to		making		incremental		adjustments		and		technical		fixes,		double		loop		reflexivity 
incorporates		critical		scrutiny		of		the		presence,		nature		and		mobilization		of		the		taken-for- 
granted		understandings		that		frame		and		support		theories		and		practices		of		governance. 
Reflexivity		and		the		Code 
The		architects		of		the		Code		seeded		reflexivity		into		its		institutionalization		where		it		is		con- 
tinuously		reviewed;		into		its		operation		where		its		application		invites		reflexive		explana- 
tions		of		non-compliance,		rather		than		rigid		adherence		to		rules;		and		into		processes		of 
organizational		learning		and		change		that		are		instigated		by		reflection		on		the		spirit,		rather 
than		the		letter,		of		the		Code. 
Institutionalization.		The		late		1980s		and		early		1990s		witnessed		a		spate		of		high		profile		cor- 
porate		collapses		and		corruption		scandals,		including		those		of		Barings		Bank,		Bank		of 
Credit		and		Commerce		International		(BCCI),		Polly		Peck		International,		and		Maxwell/Mir- 
ror		Group		Pensions		(Goodman,		2003;		Jordan,		2013:		4–5).		In		the		eyes		of		many		employ- 
ees,		consumers,		suppliers,		editors		and		voters,		lax		regulation		had		allowed		directors		to 
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misrepresent		their		companies’		financial		position		(Henry,		2008:		380),		and		it		had		thereby 
mislead		diverse		parties		affected		by		corporate		collapse.		The		resulting		drain		on		confidence 
in		corporate		governance		raised		the		spectre		of		external,		statutory		regulation		–		a		spectre 
explicitly		acknowledged		in		the		Cadbury		Report:		‘if		companies		do		not		back		our		recom- 
mendations,		it		is		probable		that		legislation		and		external		regulation		will		be		sought		to		deal 
with		some		of		the		underlying		problems		which		the		report		identifies’	(Cadbury,		2012:		1.10). 
In		response		to		the		crisis		of		confidence		in		corporate		governance,		the		Financial 
Reporting		Council		(FRC)		and		the	London		Stock		Exchange		(LSE),		together		with		the		most 
influential		of		the		accountancy		bodies		(Institute		of		Chartered	Accountants		in		England		and 
Wales		[ICAEW]),		established		the		‘Committee		on		the		Financial		Aspects		of		Corporate 
Governance’		(CFACG).		CFACG’s		prescription		for		minimizing		future		failures		of		corpo- 
rate		governance		was		the		establishment		of		a		privately		operated		Code		in		which		company 
boards		would		be		required		to		reflect		on		‘best		practice’.		Invoking		the		view		that		‘one		size 
does		not		fit		all’	in		matters		of		corporate		governance		(Arcot		and		Bruno,		2006:		5),		the		Code 
offers		an		alternative		to		hard		regulation		that		is		considered		counterproductive		as		it		fosters 
‘tickbox’	behaviour		(Pye,		2013;		Roberts,		2012).		While		the		Code		lacks		a		statutory		basis,compliance		with		it		bec
ame		a		formal		part		of		the		listing		requirements		for		the		Stock 
exchange		(Jones		and		Pollitt,		2004:		167),		thereby		creating		a		strong		presumption		in		favour 
of		compliance		in		the		operation		of		the		Code. 
The		basis		for		the		institutionalization		of		the		Code		was		the		establishment		of		a		form		of 
private		interest		government5		(see		Morgan,		2008:		641;		Streeck		and		Schmitter,		1985)		that 
headed		off		the		risk		of		‘hard’,		statutory		regulation.		In		this		context,		the		flexibility		of		the 
‘comply		or		explain’	approach		could		be		used	to		placate		critics		of		the		Code	within		the		elites 
–		notably		the		Confederation		for		British		Industry		(CBI),		which		lobbied		hard		to		exclude		its 
‘regulatory’	aspects		(e.g.		the		reporting		requirement		and		compliance		with		the		Code		as		part 
of		the		listing		requirements		for		the		Stock		exchange).	At		the		same		time,		claims		to		incorpo- 
rate		reflexivity		were		helpful		for		appeasing		sceptical		observers		by		offering		the		reassur- 
ance	that	the	voluntarism	of	‘soft’	governance	was	being	stiffened	by	an	on-going	process 
of		learning,		leading		to		the		continuous		identification,		refinement		and		implementation		of 
‘best		practice(s)’. 
Operation.		The		Code		requires		companies		to		report		on		a		set		of		issues		by		indicating		not 
only		their		degree		of		compliance		with		‘best		practices’		but		also		by		providing		an		explana- 
tion		of		any		deviation		from		them.		The		declared		purpose		of		the		explanations		is		to		point		to 
examples		of		‘better’	practice(s)		as		well		as		to		disclose		where		companies		have		fallen		short 
of		what		the		Code’s		identifies		as		‘best		practice(s)’.		It		is		important		to		appreciate		that		the 
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Code		does		not		require		compliance		per		se.		Instead,		it		seeks		recognition		and		explanation		of 
practices		that		exceed,		or		fall		short		of,		its		specification		of		‘best		practice(s)’:		‘The		Code		is 
to		be		followed		by		individuals		and		companies		in		the		light		of		their		own		particular		circum- 
stances.		They		are		responsible		for		ensuring		that		their		actions		meet		the		spirit		of		the		Code 
and		in		interpreting		it		they		should		give		precedence		to		substance		over		form’		(Cadbury 
Report:		3.10). 
In		the		Code’s		‘comply		or		explain’	approach,		it		is		acceptable,		and		indeed		it		is		expected, 
that		deviations		from		‘best		practice’		will		occur,		and		that		these		will		be		accompanied		by 
detailed		and		well		argued		explanations.		As		the		FRC		puts		it,		‘to		the		extent		that		[the		com- 
pany]		departs		from		that		code,		it		must		explain		which		parts		of		the		code		it		departs		from		and 
the		reasons		for		doing		so’		(FRCUK,		2012:		3,		emphasis		added).		Advocates		of		the		Code 
contend		that		this		quasi-voluntary		approach		offers		‘flexibility		and		intelligent		discretion 
and		allows		for		valid		exception		to		the		sound		rule’	(Arcot		and		Bruno,		2006:		2). 
The		Code		is		thus		formally		committed		to		a		bespoke		approach		that		is		intended		to		enable 
and		encourage		boardroom		members		to		emulate		what		is		taken		to		be		‘best		practice’		by 
reflecting		upon		the		relation		of		their		particular		governance		structures		and		practices		to		the 
Code’s		universal		‘best		practices’,		and		to		justify		deviations		in		relation		to		their		specific 
situation		and		priorities.		To		its		supporters,		such		justified		deviations		provide		an		invaluable 
evidence		base		for		identifying		even		‘better’	‘best		practice(s)’,		and		so		offer		pointers		to		how 
elements		of		the		Code		might		be		refined		and		improved.		In		short,		in		the		operation		of		the 
Code		as		a		work		in		progress,		‘reflexivity’	is		formally		incorporated		as		a		means		of		continu- 
ously		improving		the		Code’s		guidelines		and		their		application. 
Learning		and		change.		A		third		aspect		of		reflexivity		takes		the		form		of		the		Code’s		contribu- 
tion		to		broader		processes		of		change		in		corporations.		The		principle		of		‘comply		or		explain’and		its		voluntary		im
plementation		are		commended		for		facilitating		and		accelerating		con- 
tinuous		learning		in		which		improvements		result		not		only		from		more		widespread		adher- 
ence		to		‘best		practice’		but		also		from		deviations		that		work		in		the		spirit		of		the		Code		to 
exceed		‘best		practice’	(see		Roberts,		2012).		As		innovations		and		lessons		reported		by		indi- 
vidual		companies		are		disseminated		across		sectors,		and		may		extend		to		the		entire		economy, 
the		challenge		of		reflexivity		is,		in		principle,		not		confined		to		the		institutionalization		or 
operation		of		the		Code		and		its		commendation		of		better		corporate		governance.		It		also,		and 
again		in		principle,		challenges		passive		compliance		with		the		Code		by		stimulating		‘reflec- 
tion	on	what,	say,	corporate	governance	is	intended	to	achieve	(or	possibly	might	achieve) 
and		what		they		can		do		to		enable		such		achievement		(as		board		members,		for		example)’ 
(Scott,		2008:		174). 
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In		sum,		the		Code		can		be		considered		to		embrace		reflexivity		in		how		its		institutionaliza- 
tion		is		continuously		reviewed;		in		its		operation		through		the		application		of		reflexive		prin- 
ciples;		and		in		the		way		it		calls		on		organizational		actors		to		accomplish		change. 
The		terrain		of		corporate		governance		and		the		cultural 
grammar		of		reflexivity 
We		now		focus		more		directly		upon		reflexivity,		its		possible		forms		and		how		it		is		condi- 
tioned.		With		Ailon		(2011),		we		argue		that		the		embeddedness		of		reflexivity		in		a		particular 
‘cultural		grammar’		enables,		but		may		also		impede,		its		institutionalization		and		operation. 
Specifically,		we		illuminate		how		wider		sets		of		concerns		and		problematics,		which		we		show 
to		be		historically		present		in		the		discourse		of		corporate		governance,		are		largely		absent 
from		the		narrow		and		shallow,		‘single		loop’		reflexivity		that		informs		the		institutionaliza- 
tion		and		continuous		revision		of		the		Code. 
Single		and		double		loop		reflexivity 
Following		Ailon		(2011),		who		directly		addresses		the		cultural		grammar		of		reflexivity,		we 
are		persuaded		that		claims		about		reflexivity		should		be		treated		cautiously.		Ailon’s		key 
point		is		this:		where		the		notion		of		reflexivity		becomes		abstracted		from		specific		practices, 
it		can		defy,		or		even		escape,		critical		examination		as		it		becomes		absorbed		into,		and		diluted 
by,		a		prevailing		‘cultural		grammar’6		in		which		its		meaning		and		significance		is		(narrowly 
and		superficially)		framed.		Reflexivity		may		then		be		conceived		as		a		self-evident,		quasi- 
universal		phenomenon		that		appears		to		operate		independently		of,		or		somehow		to		float		free 
of,		culture		and		institutions		(Ailon,		2011:	144).	As		a		consequence,		there		is		limited		scrutiny 
of		the		asymmetrical		power		relations		through		which		the		meaning		and		significance		of 
reflexivity		is		culturally		defined		and		exercised.		At		worst,		enactments		of		reflexivity		serve 
simply		to		affirm		and		reproduce		the		dominant		values		of		the		field,		with		the		result		that		the 
principal		contribution		of		reflexive		interventions		is		an		endorsement		and		reinforcement, 
rather	than	a	problematization,	of	the	status	quo	(e.g.	Ailon,	2011:	159–160;	see	Boltanski 
and		Chiapello,		2007).		Ailon’s		(2011)		analysis		is		pertinent		for		appreciating		how,		when 
limited		attention		is		paid		to		the		cultural		grammar		that		endows		‘reflexive		governance’	with 
meaning(s),		the		outcome		can		be		‘a		sense-making		mechanism		cast		in		the		shape		of		its		own 
beliefs’	(Ailon,		2011:		160).When		confined		within		a		dominant,		taken		for		granted		‘cultural		grammar’	where		refl
ex- 
ivity		takes		the		form		of		a		single		loop,		the		legitimacy		of		established		preconceptions		and 
priorities		is		assumed		(Ailon,		2011:		142).		This		possibility		is		signalled		by		the		distinction 
drawn		by	Argyris		and		Schön		(1978)		when		differentiating		between		single		and		double		loop 
Working Paper Version ‘The   cultural   grammar   of governance’ 22-08-2015
 
The Modern Corporation Project
www.themoderncorporation.com
learning		(see		Tosey		et		al.,		2012		for		a		critical		review).		Single		loop		learning		leaves		largely 
unquestioned		what		Argyris		and		Schön		term		the		‘variables’		(assumptions,		goals,		values) 
that		inform		and		shape		practices,		such		as		the		‘variables’	that		condition		practices		of		corpo- 
rate		governance.		Learning/reflexive		governance		is		limited		to		developing		fixes		within 
established		parameters.		In		double		loop		learning,		in		contrast,		assumptions,		goals,		values 
and		so		forth		–		that		is,		the		‘variables’		that		are		naturalized		in		single		loop		learning		–		are 
thematized		and		interrogated.		Correspondingly,		what		we		term		double		loop		reflexivity		is		‘a 
process		involving		self-reflection		upon		problematized		beliefs		or		knowledge		limitations 
and		attempts		to		revise		them’	(Ailon,		2011:		142).		Double		loop		reflexivity		serves		to		expli- 
cate,		interrogate		and		potentially		overhaul		assumptions,		goals		and		values		embedded 
within		institutionalized		practices,		such		as		those		that		comprise		the		Code.		By		applying		this 
approach,		we		show		how		the		Code		is		embedded		in		a		dominant		cultural		grammar		that 
defines		its		reach		and		responsiveness		–		for		example,		by		setting		‘knowledge		limitations’ 
(Ailon,		2011:		142)		with		regard		to		the		forces,		processes		and		stakeholders		that		condition 
the		governance		of		corporate		activity. 
In		order		to		provide		a		context		for		our		analysis		of		the		Code,		especially		with		regard		to		the 
assumptions		and		values		institutionalized		within		it,		we		now		consider		the		deliberations 
over		corporate		regulation		during		the		decades		that		preceded		the		Code’s		introduction.		This 
enables		us		to		place		the		formation,		scope		and		content		of		the		Code		in		its		historical		setting 
and,		more		specifically,		to		appreciate		what		it		omits		to		thematize		or		address. 
The		Code		in		historical		perspective 
Twenty		years		before		the		establishment		of		the		Cadbury		Committee,		a		report		by		the		British 
Institute		of		Management		(1970)		indicated		that		companies		lacked		adequate		and		proper 
control,		and		that		directors		had		been		unable		or		unwilling		to		remove		those		responsible		for 
failures		(Parkinson,		2000:		251).		At		that		juncture,		pressures		to		rethink		and		reform		princi- 
ples		of		corporate		governance		coincided		with		Britain’s		accession		to		the		European 
Community		(EC)		in		1973		(Horn,		2012:		99).		The		1972		Draft		EC		Fifth		Directive		on		com- 
pany	law	mandated	the	separation	of	management	and	supervisory	functions	and	employee 
representation		in		the		form		of		two-tier		boards,		comprising		one-third		employees		and		two- 
thirds		shareholders.		This		was		in		addition		to		an		employee		council		entitled		to		receive		infor- 
mation		on		the		affairs		of		the		company		and		give		advice		to		management		on		certain		decisions 
(see		Clift		et		al.,		2000:		71).		The		Watkinson		Report,		published		in		1973,		found		that		the		inter- 
ests		of		workers		were		too		often		‘relegated		to		the		background’;		and		it		also		offered		proposals 
for		the		mandatory		establishment		of		two-tier		boards		of		directors,		including		worker		repre- 
sentatives		(Spira		and		Slinn,		2013:		25).		The		same		year,		the		Labour		party		was		upbeat		about 
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the		prospect		of		promoting		industrial		democracy:		‘It		is		no		longer		a		question		of		whether 
workers		should		play		a		greater		part		in		their		day-to-day		factory		life		–		but		how		this		is		to		be 
done’		(Clift		et		al.,		2000:		72).		Sharing		this		sentiment,		the		1974		Community		and		the 
Company		Green		Paper		argued		for		a		change		in		the		‘outmoded		view’		of		company		law,		inwhich		the		‘interests		o
f		the		company’	are		equated		to		the		interests		of		the		shareholders		(Clift 
et		al.,		2000:		73).		This		inclusionary		philosophy		of		corporate		governance		was		reaffirmed		in 
the		1975		European		Commission		Green		Paper		on		Employee		Participation		and		Company 
Structure		that		stated		that		‘employees		are		increasingly		seen		to		have		interests		in		the		func- 
tioning		of		enterprises		which		can		be		as		substantial		as		those		of		shareholders,		and		sometimes 
more		so’	(Horn,		2012:		92).		In		sum,		in		the		early		1970s,		deliberations		on		corporate		govern- 
ance	in	the	EU	as	well	as	in	the	UK	explicitly	advocated	and	incorporated	a	comparatively 
broad		and		inclusive		view		of		its		scope		in		which		the		interests		of		diverse		stakeholders,		and 
notably		those		ascribed		to		employees,		were		included.		This		view		drew		support		from		the 
Standards		Committee		of		the		ICAEW		that,		in		1975,		published		the		Corporate		Report. 
The		Corporate		Report 
In		common		with		interventions		summarized		above,		the		Corporate		Report		(1975)		directly 
challenged		a		conception		of		corporate		governance		concerned		only		with		‘the		protection		of 
shareholders’		and		creditors’		rights		and		property’		(Accounting		Standards		Steering 
Committee,		1975:		34)		–		a		view		that		is		described		as		‘incomplete		and		unsympathetic		to 
modern		needs’	(Accounting		Standards		Steering		Committee,		1975:		31).		One		of		the		more 
remarkable		features		of		the		Corporate		Report,		from		the		standpoint		of		the		present,		is		its 
presentation		of		evidence		that		a		large		majority		of		the		chairpersons		of		the		300		largest		UK 
companies		endorsed		a		stakeholder		conception		of		corporate		governance		(Accounting 
Standards		Steering		Committee,		1975:		38).		Shareholder		primacy,		in		contrast,		was		identi- 
fied		as		an		‘extreme		view’		and		responsibilities		towards		employees		were		rated		slightly 
higher		(71%)		than		those		to		shareholders		(69%)		(Accounting		Standards		Steering 
Committee,		1975:		93). 
It		is		relevant		to		note		how		the		stance		of		the		Corporate		Report		is		commensurate		with		the 
position		of		Company		Law		on		this		issue.		In		Company		Law,		formal		ownership		of		a		com- 
pany		resides		in		a		separate		legal		entity,		and		explicitly		not		with		shareholders		or		boards.7 
Since		the		fiduciary		duties		of		directors		are		owed		to		‘the		company’,		rather		than		to		‘the 
shareholders’,		the		company		must		be		run		‘for		itself’	by		managers		who		become		the		‘trus- 
tees’		of		the		institutional		assets		(Berle		and		Means,		2007		[1932];		Bratton,		1989;		Robé, 
2011).		Considering		that		the		company		is		built		upon		the		inputs		of		constituencies		who		ex 
ante		have		a		legitimate		and		nominally		equivalent		interest		in		‘the		company’		(see		Biondi 
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et		al.,		2007),		it		follows,		in		principle,		that		corporate		governance		is		inescapably		‘the		locus 
of		many		conflicting		claims’	(Allen,		1992:		280;		see		also		Collison		et		al.,		2014),		and		that		its 
design		and		operation		is		properly		attentive		to		‘a		diverse		range		of		variable		social		and		com- 
mercial		objectives		(Thompson,		2012:		124).		This		understanding		of		corporate		governance 
in		Company		Law		confounds		a		conception		of		the		corporate		form		as		an		instrument		‘owned’ 
by,		or		exclusively		managed		in		the		interests		of,		one		constituency		(Allen,		1992:		265; 
Crouch,		2011:		136).		Perhaps		it		was		because		the		Corporate		Report’s		identification		of 
shareholder		primacy		as		an		‘extreme		view’	was		uncontroversial		in		the		context		of		the		mid- 
1970s,		and		unexceptional		in		relation		to		the		company		law		understanding		of		corporate 
governance,		that		its		recommendations		attracted		comparatively		little		interest.		In		any 
event,		its		wide-ranging		recommendations		were		never		put		to		the		test,		as		it		was		first		over- 
shadowed		by		the		1977		Bullock		Committee		Report		commissioned		by		the		then		Labourgovernment.		Then,		in		19
79,		a		Conservative		administration,		led		by		Margaret		Thatcher, 
was		elected		on		a		ticket		to		dismantle		the		post-War,		‘one		nation’		settlement,		including		its 
corporatist		forms		of		regulation		by		unleashing		the		ostensibly		self-regulating		power		of 
(efficient)		markets,		realized		most		dramatically		in		the		‘Big		Bang’		of		financial		markets 
reform		in		1986.		Although		there		was		continuing		discussion		of		corporate		governance, 
these		discussions		were,		as		we		shall		show,		confined		to		a		much		narrower		set		of		issues. 
Non-executive		directors		(NEDs) 
The		role		of		the		Non-Executive		Director		(NED)		has		been		a		recurrent		focus		of		corporate 
governance		improvement.		In		1970,		Sir		Brandon		Rhys	Williams		introduced		a		private		mem- 
ber’s		bill		to		the		House		of		Commons		that		proposed		that		each		Board		should		appoint		at		least 
three		NEDs.	Although		the		bill		garnered		insufficient		support		to		become		law,		it		proved		to		be 
critical		in		defining		the		agenda		for		subsequent		deliberations		on		corporate		governance 
reform.		In		1973,		the		Watkinson		Report		recommended		the		inclusion		of		a		statement		in 
Annual		Reports		about		the		composition		of		the		Board		and		the		qualifications		and		interests		of 
the	NEDs,	but	without	any	legal	compulsion	to	provide	this	information	or	to	increase	their 
number.	In	1984,	PRONED	–	a	lobby	group	dedicated	to	the	appointment	of	non-executive 
directors		to		boards		–		was		formed		with		the		Bank		of		England		as		a		prime		mover		in		its		estab- 
lishment		(Spira		and		Slinn,		2013:		28),		and		with		Sir	Adrian		Cadbury		as		its		chairman		(1984– 
1996).		Guidelines		prepared		by		the		Association		of		British		Manufacturers		in		1990,		reissued 
the	following	year	by	the	Institutional	Shareholder	Committee,	adopted	the	appointment	of 
NEDs,		in		combination		with		the		provision		of		reliable		financial		information		to		shareholders, 
as	the	principal	levers	of	reform	and	a	key	marker	of	‘good	governance’	and	‘best	practice’. 
This		was		despite		the		NED		role		being		‘defined		in		vague		terms’	(Spira		and		Slinn,		2013:		29), 
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and		it		being		widely		regarded		as		‘a		refuge		for		long-serving		senior		employees,		retired		armed 
forces		personnel,		out-of-office		politicians,		titled		members		of		the		upper		classes,		and		friends 
and		relations		of		board		members’	(Spira		and		Slinn,		2013:		26). 
Commentary 
We		have		noted		how,		during		the		1970s,		a		string		of		reports		considered		the		merits		of		two-tier 
boards,		employee		representation		on		boards		and		the		benefits		of		statutory		control.		This		cul- 
tural		grammar		of		regulation		had		not		been		entirely		displaced		or		suppressed		by		the		time		that 
the		Cadbury		Committee		was		formed		in		1991		(Collison		et		al.,		2014).	Yet,		by		the		early		1990s, 
following		a		succession		of		Conservative		administrations		dedicated		to		‘market		first’	policies, 
this		grammar		had		been		progressively		marginalized		(Spira		and		Slinn		2013:		25).		In		the		new 
cultural		grammar,	increasingly		infused	by		neo-liberalism,		corporate		governance		was		mostly 
confined		to		considerations		of		the		quality		of		information		flows,		disclosure		in		relation		to		the 
competence	and	reliability	of	boards	of	directors,	and	the	salvational	role	ascribed	to	NEDs. 
The		Code		and		agency		theory 
The		restrictive		framing		of		corporate		governance		by		members		of		the		Cadbury		Committee 
was		assisted		by		developments		in		mainstream		academic		debate.		Crucially,		beginning		inthe		1970s,		the		presuppo
sitions		of		agency		theory		(e.g.		Jensen		and		Meckling,		1976),		where 
the		focus		is		narrowly		on		shareholders		and		board		members		–		as		‘principals’	and		‘agents’,8 
had		come		to		shape		and		restrict		the		theory		and		the		practice		of		corporate		governance. 
Supremacy		of		shareholders 
The		Report		of		the		Cadbury		Committee		(1992)		presupposes		the		agency		theoretic		under- 
standing		that		companies		are		run		exclusively		for		the		benefit		of		shareholders		who		are		iden- 
tified		as		the		owners		and		the		providers		of		equity		capital.		This		presumption		is		reflected		in 
the		assertion		that		the		responsibility		of		the		Board		of		Directors		is		to		protect,		and		report		on 
the		activities		of		the		company		to,		shareholders		(Cadbury		Report:		2.5–2.8;		4.2;		4.40;		4.44; 
4.59;		5.3c&d;		6.1;		6.6).		What,		then,		of		the		interests		of		other		stakeholders?		These		are 
conceived		to		be		best		and		fully		served		within		the		agency		theoretic		formula:		all		stakehold- 
ers		are		beneficiaries		of		corporations		that		generate		strong		returns		for		shareholders.9		To 
adapt		the		quote		attributed		to		Charles		Erwin		Wilson		concerning		the		identity		of		interest 
between		General		Motors		and		the		US		economy,		both		agency		theory		and		the		Code		presume 
that		what		is		good		for		shareholders		is		good		for		all		stakeholders.10		This		equation		is		explic- 
itly		affirmed		by		the		statement		in		one		of		the		reviews		of		the		Code		that		‘Good		governance 
ensures		that		constituencies		(stakeholders)		with		a		relevant		interest		in		the		company’s		busi- 
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ness		are		fully		taken		into		account’		(Hampel		Report,		1998:		7),		and		in		the		insistence		that 
‘the		directors’	relationship		with		the		shareholders		is		different		in		kind		from		their		relation- 
ship		with		the		other		stakeholder		interests’		(Hampel		Report,		1998:		12).		In		short,		the		con- 
ception		of		corporate		governance		institutionalized		in		the		Code11		privileges		the		dyadic 
relation		between		two		constituencies		–		owners		(shareholders)		and		senior		executives 
(board		of		directors)		(Daily		and		Johnson,		1997;		Daily		et		al.,		2003;		Henry,		2008:		382; 
Jackson,		2000;		Parkinson		and		Kelly,		1999:		101). 
Accountability 
In		the		dyadic		relation		between		principals		and		agents,		the		obligation		of		the		agent		(direc- 
tors		of		the		company)		is		to		make		decisions		that		maximize		shareholder		value;		and,		in 
return,		shareholders		incentivize		and		remunerate		directors		(e.g.		through		performance- 
related		pay		and		share		options).	As		agents,		executives		are		accountable		to		the		principal		(the 
shareholders)		(Daily		et		al.,		2003:		371),		and		they		are		charged		with		the		task		of		maximizing 
shareholder		value		(Blair,		1995;		Ezzamel		et		al.,		2008).		This		‘market		first’		conception		of 
‘accountability’	(Parkinson		and		Kelly,		1999:		104)		is		embedded		in		the		Cadbury		Report’s 
central		focus		upon		directors’	responsibility		to		shareholders:		‘The		issue		for		corporate		gov- 
ernance		is		how		to		strengthen		the		accountability		of		boards		of		directors		to		shareholders’ 
(Cadbury		Report:		6.1).		There		is		no		mention		of		any		other		stakeholder		to		whom		directors 
might,		or		should,		be		held		accountable:		‘It		is		for		the		shareholders		to		call		directors		to		book 
if		they		appear		to		be		failing		in		their		stewardship’	(Cadbury		Report:		6.6).		Directors		have		a 
‘responsibility’		to		stakeholders,		but		this		is		fulfilled		through		their		‘accountability’		to 
shareholders		(Hampel		Report,		1998:		12). 
The		dyadic		relation		at		the		heart		of		the		Code		is		also		apparent		in		the		restriction		of		the 
type		of		information		considered		to		enable		‘good		governance’.		‘Governance		by		disclosure’(Ezzamel		and		Watson
,		1997)		is		regarded		as		an		essential		ingredient		of		markets’	effective 
functioning		to		coordinate		and		develop		the		economy:		‘The		lifeblood		of		markets		is		infor- 
mation		and		barriers		to		the		flow		of		relevant		information		represent		imperfections		in		the 
market’	(Cadbury		Report:		4.48).	As		a		consequence		of		conceiving		of		accountability		solely 
in		relation		to		shareholders,		the		‘high		information		flows’	considered		essential		for		‘govern- 
ance		by		disclosure’	are		limited		to		the		provision		of		financial		information		for		shareholders 
(Cadbury		Report:		2.1).		With		‘accountability’		and		‘transparency’		confined		to		the		evalua- 
tion		of		financial		performance		in		relation		to		the		sentiments,		calculations		and		speculations 
of		traders		in		financial		markets		(Horn,		2012:		97),		‘monitoring’	becomes		narrowly		directed 
to		financial		market		actors		who		simultaneously		are		the		primary		definers		and		the		evalua- 
tors		of		the		scope		and		quality		of		the		accountability		and		transparency		provided. 
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Reliance		upon		the		market		and		avoidance		of		statutory		regulation 
Advocates		of		‘soft		law’	(Abbot		and		Snidal,		2000)		repeatedly		assert		that		voluntary		regula- 
tion		is		more		effective		than		statutory		regulation.		In		the		words		of		the		Cadbury		Report:		‘We 
believe		that		our		approach,		based		on		compliance		with		a		voluntary		code		coupled		with 
disclosure,		will		prove		more		effective		than		a		statutory		code’	(Cadbury		Report:		1.10).		The 
Code		rules		out		statutory		regulation		with		two		arguments.		First,		statutory		regulation		is 
considered		to		shackle		‘the		efficient		working		of		the		market		economy’		(Cadbury		Report: 
3.2)		and		‘the		efficient		operation		of		capital		markets’		(Cadbury		Report:		3.5)		by		impeding 
or		distorting		high		information		flows.		In		this		‘market		first’		argument,		such		distortion		is 
seen		to		constrain		the		effective		operation		of		markets		(Cadbury		Report:		1.9).		Second,		statu- 
tory		regulation		is		considered		to		foster		only		formal,		visible		compliance		(Roberts,		2012), 
and		so		fails		to		provide		an		effective,		substantive		means		of		control.		The		idea		that		statutory 
regulation		and		control		could		lead		to		ritualistic,		‘prescriptive		box-ticking’		(Hampel 
Report,		1998:		10–11;		Higgs		Report,		2003:		13)		is		frequently		repeated		in		the		Code.	At		the 
same		time,		the		potential		criticism		that		the		Code		itself		might		comprise		‘sets		of		prescriptive 
rules’	(Hampel		Report,		1998:		7),		and		so		contribute		to		‘box-ticking’	and/or		would		foster		a 
‘one		size		fits		all’	approach		(see		Pye,		2013:		appendix		2;		Combined		Codes		of		2003,		2006 
and		2008;		FRCUK,		2012),		is		firmly		rejected.		The		rejection		takes		the		form		of		assertions 
and		reassurances		that		the		‘comply		or		explain’		mechanism		and		the		prospect		of		making 
continuous		revisionary		upgrades		of		‘best		practice(s)’		provides		flexibility		in		relation		to 
changing		circumstances. 
Agency		and		change 
To		effect		change,		the		Code		advocates		the		uptake		of		its		‘spirit’,		including		the		judicious 
engagement		of		reflexivity		in		relation		to		‘best		practice(s)’	by		company		boards:		‘To		follow 
the		spirit		of		the		Code		to		good		effect,		boards		must		think		deeply,		thoroughly		and		on		a		con- 
tinuing		basis		about		their		overall		tasks		and		the		implications		of		these		for		the		roles		of		their 
individual		members’		(FRCUK,		2012:		2,		emphasis		added).		Reflexivity		is		thus		harnessed 
to		the		pursuit		of		a		continuous		process		of		improvement		by		board		members		who		are,		within 
the		framing		of		the		Code,		induced		as		individuals		to		better		serve		‘principals’	(shareholders) 
as		their		‘agents’.The	Walker		Report,		one		of		the		most		recent		reviews		of		the		Code,		attributes		deficiencies 
of		governance		‘much		more		to		patterns		of		behaviour		than		to		organisation’	(Walker		Report, 
2009:		12);		and		it		anticipates		that		‘behavioural		changes’	will		lead		to		the		‘feeling’	of		‘own- 
ership’	of	good	corporate	governance	by	‘boards	and	their	major	owners’	(Walker	Report, 
2009:		9–10).		Where		corporate		governance		deficits		are		attributed		to		the		‘behaviour’		of 
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boards,		and		their		correction		is		achieved		by		‘behavioural		changes’,		reform		is		exclusively 
focused		upon		the		relationship		between		the		board		and		the		shareholders,		and		so		processes 
of		change		remain		a		monopoly		of		these		elite		agents		(Berk		and		Schneiberg,		2005:		49;		see 
also	Ailon,		2011:		143;		Collison		et		al.,		2014:		14). 
The		Code		embraces		agency		theory		to		frame		its		central		assumptions		(see		Jackson, 
2000;		Roberts,		2012)		about		ownership,		control,		accountability,		transparency,		monitoring, 
regulation,		agency		and		change.		It		institutionalizes		a		highly		restricted		view		about		the		rela- 
tionships		central		to		corporate		governance;		the		potential		role		of		constituencies		who		have 
created		the		assets		of		the		corporations		in		setting		corporate		strategy;		the		scope		and		direc- 
tion		of		accountability		and		transparency		within		corporations;		the		relevance		and		legiti- 
macy		of		statutory		regulation;		and		the		scope		for		effecting		change		in		corporations. 
The	shift	in	the	theory	of	corporate	governance,	occasioned	by	its	embrace	of	an	agency 
theoretic		understanding		of		business,		coincided		with		a		de		facto		concentration		of		power		in 
the		hands		of		(institutional)		investors		that,		in		the		UK,		accelerated		from		the		mid-1980s 
(Collison		et		al.,		2014:		7;		Pye,		2002:		908).	This		transformed		the		relationship		between		(insti- 
tutional)	investors	and	boards.	In	interviews	conducted	with	board	members	in	1998–2000, 
Pye		(2002:		915)		found		‘a		surprising		degree		of		consistency’	in		how		they		spoke		in		terms		of 
strategic		focus,		shareholder		value		and		corporate		governance.	An		agency		theoretic		frame		of 
reference		had		been		much		less		in		evidence		in		earlier		interviews		conducted		with		equivalent 
respondents		in		1987–1989		(Pye,		2002:		908).		By		the		end		of		the		1990s,		and		congruent		with 
the		agency		theoretic		framing		of		the		Code,		investors		had		come		to		assume		that		a		core		respon- 
sibility		of		CEOs		was		to		demonstrate		to		investors		the		logic		of		their		strategy		and		that		it		was 
their		responsibility		as		well		as		their		right		to		hold		CEOs		directly		to		account		(Pye,		2001, 
2002).		As		one		investor		stated:		‘we		have		absolute		rights		to		question		whether		the		board’s 
strategy,		management		or		capital		structure		is		right		and		if		we’re		not		satisfied		with		that		then 
we		can		.		.		.		 change		the		management’	(Pye,		2001:		189). 
In		little		more		than		20		years,		the		cultural		grammar		of		corporate		governance		had		been 
radically		overhauled.		The		agency		theoretic		framing		of		corporate		governance		informed		a 
significant		reinterpretation		of		company		law		(Bratton,		1989;		Collison		et		al.,		2014;		Ireland, 
2010),		regulation		and		rule-setting		(Roberts,		2012),		notably,		in		the		areas		of		stock		market 
listing		rules,		corporate		governance		codes,		takeover		regulations		and		tax		laws.		The		Code 
was		a		significant		element		in		this		overhaul.		Its		claims		to		a		reflexive		approach		to		corporate 
governance		provided		legitimation		for		the		institutionalization		of		agency		theory		in		corpo- 
rate		governance		theory		and		practice		and		for		market-first		approaches		to		regulatory		prac- 
tice		following		the		debacles		of		the		early		1990s. 
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Discussion:		The		Code,		agency		theory		and		reflexivity 
When		plunder		has		become		a		way		of		life		for		a		group		of		men		living		together		in		society,		they 
create		for		themselves		in		the		course		of		time		a		legal		system		that		authorizes		it		and		a		moral		code 
that		glorifies		it.		(Frédéric		Bastiat,		1845,		The		Physiology		of		Plunder)Our		analysis		has		shown		how,		as		an		exemplar		of	
	‘reflexive		governance’,		the		reflexivity 
incorporated		in		the		UK		Code		of		Corporate		Governance		is		restricted		to		what		we		have 
termed		a		single		loop.		This		is		manifest		in		multiple		ways. 
A	single		loop		type		of		reflexivity		is		present		in		the		actors		and		topics		selected		for		the		ini- 
tial		framing		of		the		Cadbury		Code.		Participation		by		groups		such		as		trade		unions,		environ- 
mentalists,		consumers		and		small		investors		was		explicitly		rejected		(Spira		and		Slinn,		2013: 
48);		and		the		parties		whose		participation		was		approved12		insisted		upon		a		highly		restricted 
agenda.13	For	example,	despite	the	chairman’s	openness	to	discussion	of	two-tier	boards,14 
this		was		excluded		because		‘[t]he		prospect		of		a		two-tier		system		was		regarded		by		both		the 
CBI		and		Institute		of		Directors		(IoD)		with		hostility’		(Spira		and		Slinn,		2013:		96).15		It		was 
also		decided		that		government		should		not		be		a		sponsor		of		the		Cadbury		Committee’s		delib- 
erations,		since		‘this		would		change		the		essentially		private		sector		and		self-regulatory		nature 
of		the		committee’		(Spira		and		Slinn,		2013:		174)		and		might		take		away		from		a		focus		on		a 
market-centric		interpretation		of		monitoring		and		control		(Spira		and		Slinn,		2013:		122).		So, 
in		contrast		to		earlier		reports		and		debates,		and		despite		the		interest		of		wider		stakeholder 
groups		in		being		directly		included		in		the		preparation		of		the		Cadbury		Report,		the		elites 
whose		members		comprised		the		Committee		ensured		that		other		constituencies		and		their 
concerns		would		be		excluded.		Unsurprisingly,		the		recommendations		of		the		Cadbury 
Committee		affirmed		the		marginalization		of		the		earlier		cultural		grammar. 
Single		loop		reflexivity		is		evident		in		how		the		guardians		of		the		Code		ignored		critical 
responses		to		its		framing		and		recommendations.		There		were		a		number		of		critical		com- 
mentaries		on		the		draft		recommendations		of		the		Cadbury		Report		that		inter		alia		questioned 
the		empty		threat		of		obligation		rules		(Spira		and		Slinn,		2013:		124)		and		delisting		(Spira		and 
Slinn,		2013:		97);		the		absence		of		means		of		enforcement		(Spira		and		Slinn,		2013:		94,		96, 
110,		117);		the		lack		of		a		strong		framework		of		accountability		and		control		with		regard		to 
executive		pay		(Spira		and		Slinn,		2013:		91);		and		the		excessive		reliance		on		NEDs		as		a		pana- 
cea		for		all		shortcomings		(Spira		and		Slinn,		2013:		97).		Instead		of		giving		serious		considera- 
tion		to		these		criticisms,		they		were		ignored		or		brushed		aside.	Amongst		the		more		trenchant 
of		them		was		Cousins		et		al.’s		prediction,		in		1991,		that		the		Code’s		positioning		of		share- 
holders		as		guardians		and		monitors		of		corporate		governance		was		non-viable		as		(institu- 
tional)		shareholders		would		lack		sufficient		commitment		to		invigilate		management 
effectively. 
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Criticisms		of		the		Code,		including		those		that		anticipated		the		unreliable		or		non-existent 
monitoring		by		market		parties,		and		the		resulting		‘creative		compliance’		(Spira		and		Slinn, 
2013:		190–191),		have		largely		been		vindicated.	The		flexibility		of		voluntary		oversight		sup- 
plied	by	‘the	market’	has	been	met	with	boilerplate	‘comply	or	explain’	statements	(Keay, 
2014;		Moore,		2009		in		Spira		and		Slinn,		2013:		202).		A		recent		review		of		the		operation		of 
the		Code		undertaken		by		accounting		firm		Grant		Thornton		observed		that		‘the		quality		of 
explanation		for		non-compliance		varied	significantly,		with		the		worst		companies		providing 
no		insight		into		the		reason		for		non-compliance		and		the		alternative		arrangements		in		place 
to		protect		shareholders’	interests’	(Grant		Thornton,		2013:		4–5).		The		fact		that		unjustified 
non-compliance		is		unmet		by		a		clear		(i.e.		punitive)		response		by		the		market		(Keay,		2014) 
as		well		as		by		regulators		may		explain		why		full		compliance,		including		‘creative		compli- 
ance’,		with		the		Code		has		been		in		the		region		of		50		percent		(Grant		Thornton,		2013).		Such 
widespread		non-compliance		suggests		that		there		is		limited		‘reflexive’		preparedness		to 
learn		and		change		–
		in		defiance		of		what		is		ostensibly		expected		by		the		Code’s		architectsand		enforcers.	The		irrelevance		of		the		‘spir
it’	of		the		Code		to		companies’	strategic		concerns 
may		reflect		an		attitude,		as		Keay		(2014)		speculates,		that		‘such		companies,		or		at		least		some 
of		them,		regard		shareholders		with		some		contempt.		The		board		might		ask		itself:		how		much 
is		sufficient		to		ensure		explanation		of		deviation?		But		this		could		be		replaced		with		the		ques- 
tion:		how		much		can		we		get		away		with?’	(Keay,		2014:		292–293). 
The		non-responsiveness		of		guardians		of		the		Code		to		its		anticipated		or		realized		failings 
is		not		limited		to		concerns		about		its		internal		functioning:		it		extends		to		their		assessment		of 
its		central		assumptions		in		the		wake		of		successive		scandals		and		crises		of		corporate		gov- 
ernance.		For		example,		in		the		context		of		a		spate		of		corporate		scandals		in		the		US,		including 
Enron,		Worldcom		and		Tyco		(Jones		and		Pollitt,		2004:		164),		the		Higgs		Report		(2003) 
affirmed		the		Code’s		market-first		approach		by		arguing		that		‘the		brittleness		and		rigidity		of 
legislation’		meant		that		statutory		regulation		was		not		‘the		way		forward’		(Higgs		Report, 
2003:		12).		It		is		difficult		not		to		infer		from		this		recommendation		that,		in		effect,		flexibility, 
which		accommodates		recklessness		by		turning		a		blind-eye		to		non-compliance,		is		pre- 
ferred		to		prudent		restrictions		on		boards		enforced		through		statutory		legislation		and		public 
accountability.		More		remarkably,		perhaps,		the		same		market-first		stance		is		taken		in		the 
Walker		Report		(2009),		commissioned		in		the		wake		of		the		2008		financial		crisis		and		follow- 
ing		the		collapse		of		major		UK		banks.		The		same		received		wisdom		is		repeated,		seemingly 
without		a		trace		of		irony,		in		the		Walker		Report’s		assertion		that		stronger		regulation		risked 
‘provoking		unintended		consequences’		(Walker		Report,		2009:		9–10).		Despite		noting 
‘serious		deficiencies		in		prudential		oversight		and		financial		regulation		in		the		period		before 
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the		crisis’	and		making		reference		to		the		‘major		governance		failures		within		banks’	(Walker 
Report,		2009:		9),		the		Walker		Report		maintains		that		‘non-statutory		routes		to		implementa- 
tion’		(Walker		Report,		2009:		11),		in		the		form		of		shareholder		monitoring		of		voluntary 
codes		of		best		practice,		delivers		effective		regulation. 
In		sum,		despite		the		problematic		empirical		relation		between		prescriptions		of		‘good 
governance’	and		the		instruments		provided		in		the		Code,		and		the		evidence		of		failing		com- 
pliance,		and		disregard		of		the		spirit		of		the		Code,		the		voluntaristic		‘comply		or		explain’ 
approach		continues		to		be		hailed		as		‘a		non-negotiable		factor		in		UK		corporate		governance’ 
(Keay,		2014:		281).		In		the		remainder		of		this		section,		we		draw		out		the		main		contributions 
of		the		preceding		analysis. 
Three		contributions 
The		first		contribution		has		been		to		explicate		and		critique		the		limits		of		the		reflexivity		incor- 
porated		into		the		claims		of		‘reflexive		(approaches		to)		governance’.		As		an		instrument		of 
regulation		that		trumpets		its		reflexive		credentials,		the		Code		has		harboured		a		narrow,		single 
loop		reflexivity		that		renders		its		design		and		operation		unresponsive		to,		and/or		dismissive 
of,		critical		scrutiny.		Notwithstanding		calls		for		more		substantial,		structural		change		in 
response		to		the		fall-out		from		successive		scandals		and		crises,		and		disillusionment		with		the 
contemporary		machinery		of		corporate		governance		(e.g.		Garratt,		forthcoming),		reviews		of 
the		Code		have		consistently		confined		reform		proposals		to		an		intensification		of		efforts		to 
devise		and		implement		technical		fixes		(e.g.		placing		greater		responsibilities		upon		NEDs) 
(Parkinson		and		Kelly,		1999:		102;		Pye,		2001:		190;		Roberts		et		al.,		2005:		21),		or		recom- 
mending		enhanced		disclosure		of		financial		information.It		is		therefore		plausible		to		conclude		that		reviews		of		the	
	Code		are		largely		ceremonial. 
Their		single		loop		reflexivity		results		in		the		design,		operation		and		review		of		the		Code, 
and		of		the		agency		theoretic		understanding		of		‘ownership’		and		‘accountability’		that 
undergirds		it,		being		somewhat		shielded		from		examination		and		challenge.16		The		succes- 
sive		reviews		of		the		Code		have		produced		‘changes		at		the		margins		which		retain		inde- 
pendence	but	keep	at	bay	government	regulation’	(Bowden,	2000:	184;	see	also	Armour 
et		al.,		2003:		532;		Gospel		and		Pendleton,		2003:		560;		Horn,		2012:		86;		Jackson,		2000; 
Jones,		1995;		Spira		and		Slinn,		2013:		42;		Tsuk,		2003).		As		a		consequence,		the		Code		con- 
tinues		to		act		as		a		flexible		buffer		for		impeding		and		deflecting		discussion		of		a		broader 
conception		of		corporate		governance		where		the		diverse		interests		of		multiple		stakehold- 
ers		are		acknowledged		and		to		some		extent		incorporated		(Jackson,		2000:		267)		–		as		sig- 
naled		in		company		law		(Collison		et		al.,		2014;		Parkinson,		2000)		and		gestured		toward		in 
earlier		reports		(e.g.		the		Corporate		Report,		1975)		that		were		framed		within		an		earlier, 
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more		inclusive		cultural		grammar. 
The		second,		related		contribution		of		our		analysis		has		been		to		provide		a		comparatively 
detailed		account		of		how		a		shallow,		single		loop		reflexivity		has		contributed		to		the		institu- 
tionalization		and		legitimation		of		a		particular		kind		of		political		economy.	As		a		consequence 
of		the		embedding		and		protecting		of		agency		theoretic		assumptions		in		the		Code,		sharehold- 
ers		are		privileged		as		the		primary		recipients		of		value;		a		narrow		focus		on		legal		and		eco- 
nomic		accountability		by		boards		to		market		actors		is		taken		as		given		and		sufficient;		change 
is		framed		as		exclusively		board-centric;		and		reliance		on		a		private,		non-binding		framework 
based		upon		voluntary		disclosure		of		non-compliance		with		best		practice		is		regarded		as 
self-evidently		effective		and/or		appropriate		(Keay,		2014;		Parkinson,		2000:		256).		The		grip 
and		influence		of		these		assumptions,		or		articles		of		faith,		is		perhaps		most		evident		in		how 
successive		crises		of		1990,		1999,		2003		and		especially		2008		–		which		were,		arguably, 
symptomatic		of		a		deep-seated		malaise		in		the		theory		and		practice		of		corporate		governance 
–		have		been		met		by		unwavering		responses,		in		the		form		of		reviews		that		reaffirm		the		effi- 
cacy		of		agency		theoretic		prescriptions		in		which		a		market-first		approach		is		conceived		to 
produce		the		greatest		social		utility		for		all		stakeholders		(see		Glynos		et		al.,		forthcoming).		In 
this		way,		a		shallow		application		of		reflexivity		leads		to		a		consistent		defense		of		a		political 
economy		of		corporate		governance		deeply		influenced		by		agency		theory. 
The		third		contribution		has		been		to		note		the		existence		and		significance		of		the		design 
and		operation		of		corporate		governance		that		is		wider-ranging		and		more		penetrating.		By 
enabling		critical		reflection		upon		the		‘variables’	(assumptions,		goals,		values)		(see	Argyris 
and		Schön,		1978)		that		condition		contemporary		corporate		governance		practices,		there		is 
the		prospect		of		recognizing		how		it		was		only		in		the		1980s		that		agency		theory		began		to 
assume		centre		stage		in		thinking		on		corporate		governance		(Aglietta		and		Rebérioux,		2005), 
company		law		(Collison		et		al.,		2014:		15)		and		accounting		(Biondi		et		al.,		2007).		As		a		con- 
sequence		of		the		Code’s		reliance		on		agency		theory,		a		dyadic		model		(Jackson,		2000)		has 
become		hegemonic		in		which		the		participation		of		wider		constituencies		in		the		creation		and 
maintenance		of		corporate		assets		(Berle		and		Means,		2007		[1932];		Biondi		et		al.,		2007; 
Blair,		1995;		Zingales,		2000)		is		effectively		denied		or		dismissed.		When		adopting		a		double 
loop		approach,		contemporary		notions		of		accountability		and		fiduciary		duty		may		be		sub- 
jected		to		critical		scrutiny.		It		also		becomes		possible		to		examine		the		role		and		significance 
of		the		elite		actors		that		have		shaped		the		cultural		grammar		informing		the		field		of		corporategovernance		by		invo
king		narrow		conceptions		of		corporate		purpose,		ownership		and 
control. 
Taken		together,		the		first		two		contributions		of		the		article		illuminate		the		Code’s		incor- 
poration		of		a		single		loop		notion		of		reflexivity		that		acts		to:		legitimate		and		institutionalize 
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asymmetrical		relations		of		power		and		privilege;		sustain		a		particular		kind		of		financialized 
political		economy		(see		Chorev		and		Babb,		2009;		Crouch,		2011;		Duménil		and		Lévy,		2001; 
Harvey,		2009);		and		obscure		the		role		of		elites		as		the		principal		architects,		guardians		and 
beneficiaries		of		the		institutionalization		of		those		relations.		And		the		third		contribution 
opens		up		a		broader		vista		that		includes		inter		alia		consideration		of		historical		accounts		and 
more		expansive		possibilities		for		corporate		governance		theory		and		practice. 
Summary		and		conclusions 
We		have		examined		‘reflexive		governance’	by		reference		to		the		incorporation		of		reflexivity 
within		the		design		and		operation		of		the		UK		Code		of		Corporate		Governance.		Claims		of 
reflexivity		in		corporate		governance		theory,		policy		and		practice		merit		close		and		critical 
attention		because		corporations		play		such		a		central		role		in		(re)creating		the		modern		world, 
and		in		shaping		our		future		(Ireland,		2005).		Claims		to		reflexivity		also		merit		examination 
because		they		contribute		significantly		to		the		positive		appreciation		and		reputation		of		the 
Code’s		‘soft		law’		approach		to		regulation		that		has		been		commended		as		a		blueprint		for 
corporate		governance		codes		worldwide		(Henry,		2008:		400;		Jordan,		2013:		9,		26).		The 
economic		and		political		significance		of		the		Code		and		its		single		loop		application		of		reflex- 
ivity		is		not,		of		course,		limited		to		the		UK.		In		a		global		context,		where		the		embrace		of		free 
market		enterprise		and		private		sector		management		is		extensive		(Pye,		2002:		913),		the		Code 
has		become		a		pillar		for		the		worldwide		institutionalization		and		spread		of		the		theory		and 
practice		of		‘soft		law’. 
With		regard		to		the		legitimacy		of		the		Code		and		its		claims		to		reflexivity,		our		analysis		has 
shown		how		it		has		exhibited		remarkable		resistance		to		change		in		the		face		of		empirical		chal- 
lenges,		internal		as		well		as		external,		to		its		design		and		operation.		Promises		and		reassur- 
ances		made		in		the		name		of		(single		loop)		reflexivity		have		kept		statutory		regulation		at		bay, 
while		evidence		of		widespread		non-compliance		with		the		Code’s		‘best		practice(s)’	and		its 
‘comply		or		explain’		principles,		as		well		as		ongoing		and		intensifying		crises		of		corporate 
governance,		have		simply		prompted		reiterations		of		the		same		formula.		No		matter		the		sever- 
ity		of		the		empirical		challenge		to		its		claims,		every		revision		of		the		Code		has		affirmed		and 
sustained		its		market-centric		conception		of		accountability;		its		voluntaristic		and		unac- 
countable		concepts		of		regulation		and		change;		and		its		understanding		of		political		economy 
guided		by		agency		theory.		Since		the		Code		effectively		‘re-embeds		critical		reflection		into 
the		same		culture		it		appears		to		distance		itself		from’		(Ailon,		2011:		161),		the		reflexivity 
attributed		to		it		is		seemingly		impervious		to		calls		for		change.		Claims		to		reflexivity		are 
invoked		to		provide		legitimacy		but,		in		practice,		the		Code’s		single		loop		reflexivity		denies 
the		possibility		of		critically		inspecting		its		limits		and		impedes		the		contemplation		of		other 
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designs. 
The		application		of		single		loop		reflexivity		to		the		design		and		operation		of		the		Code		is 
not		merely		an		epistemological		problem;		it		is		also		an		economic		and		political		one.		The 
Code	at	once	accommodates	and	naturalizes	an	agency	theoretic	philosophy	(see	Collisonet		al.,		2014:		7).		A		dyadic	
	conception		of		the		core		corporate		governance		relationship,		and 
the		emphasis		placed		on		the		creation		of		shareholder		value,		accommodates		an		expanding 
use		of		share		buybacks,		the		raising		of		stock		dividends,		and		the		rise		of		executive		remunera- 
tion.		Simultaneously,		it		diminishes		the		resources		available		for		R&D,		discourages		invest- 
ments		into		sustainability,		and		reduces		the		share		of		wealth		distributed		to		workers		(Aglietta 
and		Rebérioux,		2005;		Lazonick		and		O’Sullivan,		2000).17		In		such		ways,		single		loop 
reflexivity		affirms		and		reinforces		an		approach		to		corporate		governance		that		advances		and 
secures		the		priorities		of		financial		and		executive		elites		by		supporting		an		increasingly 
financialized		political		economy		worldwide		in		which		‘a		small		minority		.		.		.		 appropriate		a 
grotesquely		disproportionate		share		of		total		social		wealth		and		production,		both		nationally 
and		internationally’	(Ireland,		2000:		172). 
The		hegemony		of		single		loop		reflexivity		serves		to		maintain		a		single-minded		focus		on 
‘markets		as		seemingly		impartial,		impersonal		means		of		ensuring		effective		regulation’ 
(Parkinson,		2000:		262).	Ascribing		a		monopoly		of		effective		regulation		to		markets		diverts 
attention		from		two		elephants		in		the		room		–		the		ever-present		possibility		of		government 
intervention,		in		the		form		of		either		British		or		EU		regulation,		intended		to		address		the		social 
injustices		occasioned		by		the		narrowness		and		deficits		of		contemporary		corporate		govern- 
ance		(Bowden,		2000:		184;		Clift		et		al.,		2000:		75–76;		Jones		and		Pollitt,		2004;		Keay,		2014; 
Parkinson,		2000:		253;		Spira		and		Slinn,		2013:		92–93);		and		the		politics		involved		in		the 
design		and		operation		of		corporate		governance		itself.		In		sum,		single		loop		reflexivity		has 
provided		a		flexible		buffer		sufficiently		resilient,		to		date,		to		impede		or		deflect		more		prob- 
ing		critiques		of		the		ways		in		which		a		neo-liberal		political		economy		was		embedded		in		the 
Code		and		defended		by		elites		who		stood		to		gain		the		most		from		this		approach		to		corporate 
governance		and		regulation. 
By		invoking		a		broader		cultural		grammar		to		frame		the		Code,		our		purpose		has		not		been 
to		lionize		a		glorious		past		but,		rather,		to		stimulate		more		challenging		analyses		of		the		foun- 
dations,		scope,		design		and		operation		of		corporate		governance.		As		Arthur		Andersen 
observed		on		the		first		draft		of		the		Cadbury		Report:		‘it		is		disappointing		that		the		Report		does 
not		discuss		the		advantages		and		disadvantages		of		alternative		forms		of		governance		and 
encourage		experimentation’	(Spira		and		Slinn,		2013:		216).		In		this		spirit,		a		task		for		future 
research		is		to		engage		with,		build		upon		and		mobilize		a		countervailing		cultural		grammar		in 
ways		that		inter		alia		(i)		investigate		the		conditions		and		consequences		of		the		historical 
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development		of		corporate		governance		theory		and		practice,		including		consideration		of		its 
outcomes		for		the		many		constituencies,		including		internal		constituencies		and		the		wider 
public,	that	contribute	to,	and	depend	upon,	corporations	(see	Biondi	et		al.,	2007;	Perrow, 
2002;		Robé,		2011);		(ii)		provide		an		alternative		to		theories		of		the		corporation		and		corporate 
governance		in		which		fuller		recognition		of		its		status,		as		a		jointly		constructed		‘going		con- 
cern’		with		investments		by		many		parties,		is		accommodated		and		where		accountability		to 
those		parties		is		realized		(Biondi		et		al.,		2007);		(iii)		investigate		the		option		of		response		to 
deficits		and		failures		of		corporate		governance		by		making		use		of		statutory		law,		as		well		as 
control		and		certification;		and		(iv)		develop		a		tighter		and		more		critically		inspired		coupling 
of		wider,		policy-focused		debates		relevant		to		addressing		the		claims		of		diverse		parties, 
present		and		future,		with		a		stake		in		the		development		of		corporations18		that		are		publicly 
accountable		and		ecologically		sustainable.		In		such		ways,		critical		analysis		that		exemplifies 
double		loop		reflexivity		may		more		closely		fulfil		the		stated		goal		of		the		Cadbury		Report:		‘tocontribute		positivel
y		to		the		promotion		of		good		corporate		governance		as		a		whole’ 
(Cadbury:		1.2,		emphasis		added). 
Acknowledgements 
We		would		like		to		thank		Mahmoud		Ezzamel		and		Annie		Pye		for		their		suggestions		and		comments		on 
earlier		drafts		of		this		paper. 
Notes 
1	Sir	Adrian		Cadbury,		knighted		in		1977,		was		Chairman		of		Cadbury		Schweppes		from		1965		until 
1989	before	becoming	a	director	of	the	Bank	of	England	from	1970	to	1994	(Jones	and	Pollitt, 
2004:		166). 
2	A		string		of		UK		reviews		and		reports		on		corporate		governance		subsequently		affirmed		and 
refined		the		approach		and		recommendations		of		the		Cadbury		Committee’s		Report.		These		are 
collectively		known		as		the		‘Code		of		Best		Practice’	(hereafter		‘the		Code’). 
3	For		example,		even		though		the		Swedish		corporate		governance		system		is		barely		comparable		in 
terms	of	ownership	structure	to	the	UK,	Swedish	regulators	felt	that	adoption	of	the	principles 
of		the		UK		Code		of		Governance		was		necessary		in		order		not		to		jeopardize		foreign		investment 
(Larsson-Olaison,		2014). 
4	For		instance,		in		company		law		(Ireland,		2005;		Robé,		2011),		accounting		(Biondi		et		al.,		2007), 
economics	(Aglietta	and	Rebérioux,	2005),	politics	(Van	Apeldoorn	et		al.,	2007)	and	manage- 
ment		(Crouch,		2011;		Harvey,		2009;		Khurana,		2007). 
5	Members		and		contributors		to		the		Code		comprised		the		Institute		of		Chartered		Accountants 
of		Scotland		(ICAS),		Department		of		Trade		and		Industry		(DTI), Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales (ICAEW),	BDO,	Financial	Reporting	Council	(FRC),	Prudential	Group, 
PRONED,		Bank		of		England		(BoE)		and		Institute		of		Directors		(IoD)		(Spira		and		Slinn,		2013: 
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44–45;		52–53;		69). 
6	In	Ailon’s		work,		‘cultural		grammar’	is		broadly		understood		as		a		group		of		principles		that		struc- 
ture		the		unfolding		dynamics		of		a		sense-making		process		(Ailon,		2011:		142). 
7	See		http://themoderncorporation.wordpress.com/company-law-memo/. 
8	In		agency		theory,		executives		as		well		as		boards		serve		‘as		an		instrument		of		the		shareholders’ 
(Aglietta		and		Rebérioux,		2005:		31)		whose		role		is		defined		as		serving		the		goals		and		interests		of 
shareholders		so		as		to		maximize		shareholder		value		(Aglietta		and		Rebérioux,		2005:		31–32). 
9	In		the		deliberations		of		the		Committee,		it		is		argued		that		‘A	rising		tide		lifts		all		boats’	(Spira		and 
Slinn,		2013:		34). 
10	See		http://history.gmheritagecenter.com/wiki/index.php/Wilson,_Charles_E. 
11	Collison		et		al.		(2014:		14,		note		22)		comment,		‘the		Cadbury		Report,		the		Greenbury		Report 
and		Hampel		Committees,		the		Combined		Code,		the		Myners		Review		and		the		Higgs		Report		all 
articulate		governance		mechanisms		which		privilege		the		shareholder		and		are		aimed		at		reducing 
their		“agency		costs”’. 
12	It		is		noteworthy		that		there		is		no		clarity		on		how		the		Cadbury		Committee		was		formed		or 
by		which		criteria		(Spira		and		Slinn,		2013:		46).		Laura		Spira		notes		that		Sir		Adrian		Cadbury 
‘had		no		influence		over		appointments		to		the		Committee		–		that		process		remains		a		mystery		– 
and		all		the		members		were		in		place		before		he		took		the		chair’		(https://theconversation.com/ 
britains-broken-corporate-governance-regime-38239).
13	Austin		Mitchell,		MP,		wrote		in		a		letter		(30	August		1991)		that		the		Committee		‘looks		like		a		team 
who		have		protected,		vested		economic		interests		by		opposing		reforms		to		accounting		and		audit- 
ing’.		Sir		Adrian		Cadbury		responded		that		the		membership		of		the		Committee		‘must		be		made 
up		of		people		who		have		the		ability		to		turn		words		into		action’	(letter		to		Austin		Mitchell,		MP,		9 
September		1991). 
14	When		it		came		to		discussing		the		possibility		for		extending		the		one		tier		board		focus,		Sir	Adrian 
Cadbury		wrote:		‘why		should		the		two-tier		board		model		be		so		vehemently		opposed		by		those 
who		speak		for		British		industry?’	(Spira		and		Slinn,		2013:		120–121). 
15	The		CBI		rejected		worker		representation		on		boards		with		the		argument		that		‘a		rising		tide		lifts 
all		boats’:		‘there		is		widespread		acceptance		of		the		notion		that		the		successful		business		offering 
a		good		return		to		its		owners		will		also		discharge		its		obligations		to		its		other		stakeholders:		its 
workpeople,		customers,		suppliers,		and		the		community		in		which		it		functions’	(Spira		and		Slinn, 
2013:		34). 
16	There		is		evidence		of		strong		pressure		by		the		UK’s		Department		of		Business		Innovation		and 
Skills		and		the		FRC		to		retain		nominal		‘shareholder’		oversight		(Keay,		2014:		298–299)		and		to 
forestall		pressures		for		external		regulation. 
17	In		their		penetrating		and		forward-looking		commentary		on		the		draft		Cadbury		report,		Labour 
MPs		Mitchell		and		Cousins,		together		with		Prem		Sikka,		an		accounting		scholar,		noted		in		1991 
already		that		the		Code’s		explicit		focus		on		shareholder		value		would		lead		to		negative		outcomes 
for		investment,		research		and		development,		organic		growth		and		company		strength		(Cousins 
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et		al.,		1991). 
18	See		also		https://themoderncorporation.wordpress.com. 
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